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Abstract
Smart toys have become popular as technological
solutions offer a better experience for children. How-
ever, the technology used increases the risks to chil-
dren’s privacy, which does not seem to have become a
real concern for toy makers. Most researchers in this
domain are vague in defining their motivations due to
lack of an expert survey to support them. We conducted a
literature survey to find papers on smart toy-related chil-
dren’s privacy risks and mitigation solutions. We ana-
lyzed 26 papers using a taxonomy for privacy principles
and preserving techniques adapted from the IoT context.
Our analysis shows that some types of risks received
more attention, especially (a) confidentiality, (b) use, re-
tention and disclosure limitation, (c) authorization, (d)
consent and choice, (e) openness, transparency and no-
tice and (f) authentication. As for solutions, few were
effectively presented; the vast majority related to data
restriction – (a) access control and (b) cryptographic.
1. Introduction
Smart toys can collect and process data at real time
favored by miniaturization and lower costs of process-
ing circuits. They can connect with other toys or gad-
gets such as smartphones and access to mobile and cloud
services hence permeating the domains of the Internet
of Things (IoT). Smart toys use short- or long-range
wireless communications protocols for the acquisition,
computing and transfer of child user’s personal and non-
personal information. The National Institute of Science
and Technology (NIST) defines Personally Identifiable
Information (PII) as any information about an individual
maintained by an organization that can be used to dis-
tinguish or trace an individual’s identity, including any
information linkable to an identifiable individual.
Smart toys use PII for several reasons. For example,
pervasive location-based applications, such as Niantic’s
Pokemon GO, collect Global Positioning System (GPS)
data for outdoor playing. Smart toys such as Cognitoys’
Dino and Mattel’s Hello Barbie as well as companion
robots such as Asus’ Zenbo offers conversation func-
tions that use speech recognition and Artificial Intelli-
gence (AI) to establish and maintain a reasoning-based
dialogue with the child. Thus, they collect, share and
store PII (i.e., the child’s voice recordings).
Similar to other IoT products, ensuring the privacy of
the information collected is a critical challenge to smart
toys [1]. The concern is even greater in this case as PPI
is collected from underage users. Smart toy solutions
can be opportunities for many risks to children’s privacy,
with PII becoming a target for unauthorized data collec-
tion, storage or disclosure [2]. Smart toy makers should
consider threats and vulnerabilities to mitigate privacy
risks before marketing new products that could com-
promise children’s privacy. Smart toy solutions should
at least ensure compliance with the information privacy
and security regulations related to child users’ PII.
As this is a emergent research area, most researchers
in this domain are vague in defining their motivations
due to lack of an expert survey to support them. To
contribute with this research area, this paper presents an
analysis of the scientific papers that address some aspect
related to smart toy-related children’s privacy. We con-
ducted a systematic search1234 and found 26 papers pub-
lished from 2009 to 2019. We divide our analysis into
two parts: first, we present a content analysis of these
papers that allows us to understand the evolution of the
topic over the years; then, we present an axial analysis
of how these papers deal with different aspects of pri-
vacy risks. Since authors from interdisciplinary areas do
not always follow a common and well-defined nomen-
1 String: “(privacy OR private OR security OR secret OR confiden-
tial OR safety OR vulnerable OR protect OR preserve OR reliability
OR sensitive) AND ((smart OR connected OR clever OR intelligent
OR anthropomorphic OR humanoid OR humanlike OR interactive OR
cognitive OR social OR educational OR internet OR IoT OR online)
W/5 (toys OR playthings OR dolls OR barbie))”. Stems were used to
help find relevant papers (e.g., ‘vulnerab*’ was used for ‘vulnerable’).
2 Databases: Scopus and Web of Science.
3 Inclusion criterion: the paper discusses children’s privacy issues
when using smart toys and possibly solutions to such privacy issues.
4 Exclusion criteria: the paper is not fully published in English,
published as an abstract, or not a peer reviewed scientific work.
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clature for terms related to privacy and security risks,
threats and vulnerabilities, we use risk here as a general
term to refer to all these related terms.
This paper introduces children’s privacy concepts,
compares related work, presents our content analysis
followed by the axial analysis and ends with conclusion.
2. Children’s Privacy
IoT-related products offer risks to the user’s privacy
as they can collect, store and manage PII, including shar-
ing users’ PII with third parties. Governmental enti-
ties are worldwide taking efforts to regulate data privacy
protection rules to be employed in companies and or-
ganizations. For example, the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) [3] gives control to individuals over
their personal data and simplifies the regulatory envi-
ronment for international business by unifying the regu-
lation within the Europe Union. GDPR defines Personal
Data (PD) as anything containing directly or indirectly
compromising information that can expose user privacy
and allow the singling out of individual behavior. De-
spite small differences between the concepts of NIST’s
PII and GDPR’s PD, both refer to similar contexts dis-
tinguished only by the regulations they govern. PII is
the most widely used term in North America; thus, in
this study, we use the term PII.
Privacy protection aims to enable parents to control
the privacy of their children by specifying their toy-
related privacy preferences, assuming there is an accu-
rate privacy policy with which the toy complies through
a privacy protection mechanism attached to the toy [4].
Other examples of privacy regulations are the Canadian
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Docu-
ments Act (PIPEDA) [5] and Brazilian General Law of
Protection of Personal Data (GLPPD) [6]. Further, the
American Federal Trade Commission (FTC) offers spe-
cific PII regulations to children’s privacy, governed by
the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA)
[7]. COPPA protects the online privacy of children un-
der 13 and states that a child’s PII cannot be collected
without parental consent. In 2010, an amendment to
COPPA further elaborated that PII includes geolocation
information, photographs and videos [8].
Those privacy regulations became quality references
for protecting the smart toy-related children’s privacy
since consumers, particularly parents, are aware of these
privacy risks. Thus, addressing concrete solutions to
mitigate those risks is essential to support the promising
future of smart toy markers. Privacy risks can compro-
mise the future for smart toys in the consumer’s market,
such as by affecting purchase intent and the distribution
of these products to a worldwide audience [9, 10].
3. Related Work
With a significant number of works addressing pri-
vacy and security concerns regarding smart toys, no sys-
tematic study has been published to date that analyzes.
Some literature reviews cover smart toy-related topics
without covering any privacy or security concerns. Two
of them address the application of smart toys in a spe-
cific context: clinical treatment [11, 12]. Another re-
view identifies the different types of interactions be-
tween users and smart toys, classifying them into dif-
ferent categories, genres, and setups based on their play
and interface features [13]. Secondary studies on pri-
vacy and security in broader research areas such as IoT
[14], Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) [15] and big data
[16] fail to address smart toys as this is a very specific
subject and they refer to it in more general aspects.
As a contribution, we conducted a systematic search
[17, 18] of scientific papers addressing smart toy-related
children’s privacy risks and, potentially, mitigation so-
lutions. As a result, we found 26 papers. To analyze
the coverage of these works on smart toy-related chil-
dren’s privacy risks, we followed two steps: content
analysis and axial analysis. Content analysis presents a
chronological and contextualized analysis of each paper.
Through this analysis, it is possible to follow and under-
stand the evolution of the research that has been carried
out in this area. Second, axial analysis classifies the 26
papers based on the taxonomy proposed by Loukil et al.
[14], considering smart toys as a type of IoT.
4. Content analysis
We present here a chronological and contextualized
analysis of each of the 26 papers. Through this analysis,
it is possible to follow and understand the evolution of
the research that has been carried out in this area.
The first work, robot toys. Denning et al. [19]
found issues related to children’s privacy risks associ-
ated with the use of smart robot toys that present char-
acteristics such as mobility, dexterity, sensing and output
capability, and wireless communication. The authors
conducted non-extensive experiments with two robot
toys to identify privacy and security vulnerabilities and
classified the findings into: remote identification, eaves-
dropping, unauthorized operational notifications, unau-
thorized remote control and compromised network se-
curity. They found several potential risks that included
spying, vandalism and psychological attacks. Spying is
the most serious and refers to the possibility of an at-
tacker compromising one of the robot toys and leverag-
ing its built-in video camera to spy on a child in their
bedroom. Vandalism refers to damage of fragile ob-
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jects in the surrounding environment whereas psycho-
logical attacks may include for example hijacking au-
dio capabilities to cause distress to a child or remotely
controlling the robot to arrange objects on the ground
in a threatening symbol. The authors proposed 14 de-
sign questions for the development of household robots,
including five related to security and privacy questions.
A new type of threat: online pedophiles. Yong
et al. [20] were the only ones to address the threat of
online pedophiles in the smart toy context. They were
concerned with small children being exploited online
when using these toys as they are technically vulnera-
ble to virtual eavesdropping if not secure in terms of re-
mote access, either by close proximity, by the internet
connection or by VoIP. The authors provide four sce-
narios of potential threats in which smart toys can help
pedophiles. For risk mitigation, they propose technolog-
ical solutions for toy companies and consumers that can
be categorized into VoIP protection strategies, remote
control connection, wireless connection, parental con-
trol strategies, camera protection strategies, shared risk
perspective and general protection strategies. As in the
previous work [19], these are very high-level guidelines
to help the work of smart toy developers.
Stealing data... and the toy. Pleban, Band and
Creutzburg [21] found two major security-related tech-
nical vulnerabilities: (1) full access control to a toy
drone can be gained with root shell over an unencrypted
Wi-Fi network and (2) data on a USB device connected
to a toy drone can be accessed remotely by people con-
nected to the FTP server. Possible threats are, respec-
tively, theft of the toy itself or of private data. As a
solution, they presented technical steps to perform the
cross-compilation of the programs involved, which re-
quire technical knowledge. Although these are concrete
steps and not just general guidelines, they represent not
a generic solution for any similar toy with similar issues.
Hello Barbie, not keeping secrets. Jones and
Meurer [22] were concerned with data disclosure and
conducted experimental works to evaluate the toy’s abil-
ities in keeping data privacy, considering also parental
supervision. They did not identify technical issues; but
they concluded that the toy is not designed for keeping
secrets, neither child’s from parents nor parents’ from
third parties. Simulating for children that the toy keeps
their secrets from their parents can be a psychologi-
cal risk. While this is not exactly a problem as it de-
pends on how parents and society view this issue, design
decisions supported by children’s specialists could be
made to improve this point. The authors propose greater
transparency by the toy maker, offering choice opportu-
nities for the parents. Later [23], they highlighted the
need to adapt privacy policies to the IoT world.
Hacking Hello Barbie. Holloway and Green [24]
analyzed how the news and public discourses describe
risks of smart toys and studied consumer concerns.
They were motivated by general risks such as: chil-
dren’s dataveillance (i.e., corporate and government
surveillance of children’s activities and encroachments
upon their data privacy and security), illegitimate access
to children’s information through hacking of internet-
connected toys, geolocational tracking of children and
unauthorized remote control of toys’ recording and
speaking devices. They evaluated VTech’s Learning
Lodge and Hello Barbie. They analyzed several media
reports, including the hacking of Hello Barbie by a secu-
rity expert. Concerns raised include the lack of regula-
tory direction relating to children’s data privacy and se-
curity. They raised the need for more research to encour-
age the creation of new legislation with effective policies
and possible sanctions for toy makers. However, as in
most previous works, they focus on the discussion of
privacy risks, without proposing effective solutions.
Hello Barbie, indiscreet subjects. Hung et al. [1]
analyzed the Hello Barbie’s privacy policies and fea-
tures of its parental control tool. They identified a poor
parental control over the collection and retention of sen-
sitive user data. They raised privacy concerns from the
predetermined phrases the toy uses to talk to children,
which might encourage them to reveal private informa-
tion indirectly. Possible leaks of sensitive information to
third parties can cause a physical safety risk to the child.
They suggest as future work to address special privacy
requirements for child users because of their vulnerabil-
ity and propose a framework that can provide adequate
parental control for the child users’ parents.
Privacy requirements for smart toys. Hung, Fanti-
nato and Rafferty [8] discussed privacy requirements
targeted at child using smart toys. The motivation is the
risk of physical safety for child users caused, for exam-
ple, by child predators. The requirements are grouped
into: end-user requirements for children, parental con-
trol, privacy laws and regulations, health Canada’s
safety requirements for children’s toys and related prod-
ucts, industry guidelines and best practices. The au-
thors again pointed out the need for a standardized chil-
dren’s protection framework for parental control as fu-
ture work. While they are high-level requirements, this
was the first paper to contribute more concretely to the
context of smart toy-related children’s privacy.
Conceptual model for privacy rules. Rafferty et
al. [25] proposed a conceptual model to enable par-
ents (or legal guardians) to provide consent through ac-
cess rules that define that their child’s data to be shared
according to their privacy preferences. The proposed
model involves concepts of smart toy, mobile services,
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device, location and guidance with related privacy en-
tities: purpose, recipient, obligation and retention for
smart toys. The model allows parents to create privacy
rules and receive acknowledgments regarding their chil-
dren’s privacy-sensitive data. Rules created by the par-
ents can include, for example, the rights to request the
restriction of the data usage, to access and inspect the
stored data, to request data deletion and to be notified
about data sharing. The conceptual model includes the
access control model (core and extended), a policy rule
creation process and an access control decision process.
The proposal in this work is a concrete contribution that
could be taken as the basis for the toy industry – either
naturally or through legislation – to support the develop-
ment of appropriate parental control tools.
Toys that listen... and children unaware. Semi-
structured interviews were conducted by MyReynolds
et al. [26] with parent-child pairs interacting with two
smart toys. They were motivated by the news reports
on parent’s and children’s data storage, the hacking
of data that allowed children identification and loca-
tion and issues with toy’s privacy policies. The main
findings were: children were often unaware that others
might be able to hear what was said to the toy whereas
parents were concerned with what data would be re-
tained by the company. Based on their findings, the
authors proposed a set of privacy-related recommenda-
tions: (1) for toy makers – producing toys that make
children aware of recording, using less remote process-
ing to avoid the need for recording, deleting recording
after use and considering ethical aspects when offering
resources; and (2) for lawmakers – helping children, par-
ents and toy makers become more aware of privacy is-
sues, strengthen the existing children’s privacy protec-
tions such as COPPA and addressing the same issues
with other similar internet-connected devices also used
by children such as Siri, Amazon Echo and Alexa.
Security requirements for smart toys. Carvalho
and Eler [27, 28, 29] addressed smart toy-related secu-
rity rather than privacy, assuming security needs should
be guaranteed first so privacy can also be ensured. First,
they used a well-defined security requirements engineer-
ing approach for guidance. They identified 12 security
issues, 15 security threats and 20 security requirements
associated with smart toys [27]. The security issues
were raised from COPPA and PIPEDA. The security
threats are grouped into spoofing, tampering, repudia-
tion, information disclosure, denial of service and ele-
vation of privilege. The security requirements address
security concepts mainly related to confidentiality, in-
tegrity, availability, privacy, non-repudiation and au-
thenticity. Later [28, 29], they related GDPR with ex-
tra security issues and security requirements. They also
proposed a testing strategy to evaluate security issues
and requirements, which envisions the execution of dif-
ferent testing types at different stages of development –
implementation, verification and release – of smart toys.
They evaluated flaws reported in the news for five smart
toys. They concluded that many of the reported breaches
would have been avoided if these security issues and re-
quirements had been addressed by toy makers.
Hello Barbie... the duty to report! While some re-
searchers consider recording and listening to children’s
conversations with Hello Barbie and similar smart toys
an ethical issue as it can pose a privacy and trust vi-
olation, Moini [30] considers that the toy (in fact, the
company responsible for it) has an obligation to do so.
For the author, computer technicians, service providers
and toy companies have a duty to monitor and track
suspicious recordings on critical matters such as sex-
ual abuse. However, according to her studies, existing
children’s privacy regulations do not guarantee such an
obligation to companies, not even COPPA. Thus, she
proposed an amendment to COPPA to include this obli-
gation. She presented a full and detailed draft proposal
of this amendment for COPPA.
Dino asking to open the house door? Valente and
Cardenas [31] conducted experiments with Dino, and
two problems were found. On privacy, they showed it
was possible to eavesdrop on the communication be-
tween the toy and the cloud by decryption. As for secu-
rity, they showed it was possible to inject audio into the
toy so it could be played for the child. Audio injection
causes risks, including physical safety (e.g., the toy can
ask the child to open the house door) and psychological
safety (e.g., the toy can bully the child). Both the eaves-
dropping and audio injection attacks are performed by
injecting RTP (Real-time Transport Protocol) traffic di-
rectly into the network traffic communication to a Dino
toy, which cannot be avoided due to the protocol nature.
A solution is to change RTP by SRTP (Secure Real-time
Transport Protocol), which provides message authenti-
cation and integrity checking, and protection against re-
play attacks on the RTP traffic. The authors reported
collaborating with the toy maker to correct the issue.
Which smart toy is less vulnerable? Mahmoud et
al. [32] proposed an analytical framework to evaluate
smart toy privacy practices with 17 privacy-sensitive cri-
teria split into five categories: application authenticity
and permissions; privacy policy documentation; terms
of user documentation; information collection; and in-
formation storage, sharing and protection. With this
framework, they analyzed 11 smart toys. The evalu-
ation was based on publicly available privacy policies
and terms of use documentation as well as static analysis
of toys’ companion apps. They reported: (1) excessive
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collection of children’s private information, (2) incom-
plete/lack of information on data storage location and le-
gal compliance and (3) over-privilege with the potential
to leak child’s private information in most apps. Some
of the 17 features evaluated were not found for any of
the toys, such as reasonable-permissions, reasonable-
PII-collection and data-storage-location. Only two of
the toys offer more than half of the evaluated features:
Hello Barbie (11 full) and Anki Cozmo (8 full and 3
partial). The scenario may be worse considering a dy-
namic evaluation since some reported features may not
have been implemented or correctly implemented.
Is any smart toy getting a badge A? Haynes et al.
[33] proposed an evaluation framework that presents a
set of standards that should be fulfilled as privacy and
security prerequisites for a toy to be marketed. It is
based on the NIST documentation and includes six cri-
teria related to product packaging notification, secure
communication and data storage, ongoing vulnerability
scanning, independent security audits, no default pass-
words and secure remote access and updates. These au-
thors innovate by suggesting a consumer-oriented badge
for these toys, which would be classified as A+, A, B+,
B or C, depending on the number of met criteria. The
authors considered issues in smart toys reported in the
media news. They assessed seven smart toys. None of
them received A+ or A, and only the last two were the
best ranked with B+. In addition, no smart toy met the
independent security audits criterion.
Fictitious toy... real risks. Demetzou, Bo¨ck and
Hantter [34] followed the privacy by design approach to
identify smart toy-related children’s privacy risks. The
authors used a generic model that identified risks asso-
ciated with: data misuse; data leakage; lack of control
over own data; algorithmic classification of children in
incorrect profiles; surveillance/eavesdropping for black-
mail, kidnapping, pedophilia etc.; and parents checking
on their children. They advocated following the data
minimization principle in line with the GDPR’s purpose
limitation principle to mitigate those risks and discussed
technical solutions to be adopted to achieve these two
principles. Even with data minimization, there is still a
need to reduce the risk of attacks with security measures,
such as: (1) using a Trusted Third Party (TTP) to prevent
unauthorized targeted advertisements, (2) anonymizing
communication endpoints with anonymizing services to
prevent tracking the location of the toy and hence the
child; (3) using robust encryption protocols to prevent
external parties from accessing the transmitted data; (4)
using robust authentication to prevent even those with
the correct application from gaining unauthorized ac-
cess; and (5) encrypting all stored data in the toy to pre-
vent data from being accessed in case of theft.
Would you buy a Hello Barbie for your child?
Fantinato et al. [10] studied how consumers in emerg-
ing countries, whose markets still do not have access
to most smart toys, see privacy risks related to Hello
Barbie. They conducted a survey with 118 potential
consumers in Brazil and Argentina. The authors as-
sessed the perceptions of consumers on the innovative-
ness, risks and benefits of the toy’s conversation function
as well as the participants’ purchase intents. The results
showed participants from both countries rated smart toys
as equally innovative and risky, which shows that these
potential consumers are already concerned on data pri-
vacy, although they were not informed of such problems
through the news. The results also showed that Brazil-
ians have a more positive perception of the toy and hence
higher purchase intent than the Argentinians. Such a dif-
ference may be explained by small cultural differences
between the two countries, such as higher risk tolerance,
although both are neighbors and have a similar econ-
omy. The authors concluded their paper with sugges-
tions for toy makers to reduce privacy issues by improv-
ing parental control tools using data mining.
Should parents be the only responsible for pro-
tecting the child’s PII? Kshetri and Voas [35] presented
a brief analysis of children’s privacy risks in this sce-
nario. First, they discussed several reasons that may
make it more interesting to steal children’s data and
identity than adults’ ones. They then examined regu-
latory initiatives to protect children from the harmful
effects attributed to smart toys. Finally, they analyzed
initiatives by government agencies and private watch-
dog groups to alert the public about the privacy and se-
curity risks of smart toys. The authors concluded that:
(1) makers do not seem to have the capability, resources
and motivation to strengthen the security level of their
smart toys; (2) regulatory efforts to address this issue are
incipient, a gap that various government agencies and
consumer watchdog groups are trying to fill; and (3) for
now, parents are solely responsible for monitoring the
use of smart toys and protecting children’s data.
Does everything need to go to the cloud?
Espinosa-Aranda et al. [36] were concerned with the
emotional recognition functionality of smart toys. This
functionality typically needs to send the child’s captured
data for processing in the cloud, leading to different
types of privacy risks. They proposed a technique us-
ing deep learning so that the processing is carried out
locally in the toy. The authors argue that the emotional
state of a child or infant is a piece of private informa-
tion that must be preserved. In addition to not being
sent to the cloud for processing, the information can be
stored encrypted in the toy and accessed through secure
password access mechanisms. Besides, they conducted
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a pilot experiment to show the feasibility of the proposed
solution and were satisfied with the results.
How good are the privacy policies of toy compa-
nies? Chowdhury [37] investigated the privacy poli-
cies of 15 connected or smart toys. The work aimed
to answer 16 questions on privacy and security related
to security level, password, encryption, user control,
user data removal, user awareness, non-essential data
collection, third-party access protection, the existence
of privacy policy document, notification of a change
in the privacy policy, among others. Most toy makers
do not mention or clarify in their privacy policy docu-
ments how their toys protect users’ security and privacy.
Thus, they recommended more explicit privacy policies
so parents can have transparency to decide whether to
buy smart toys for their children. A Frequently Asked
Questions (FAQ) with privacy items should accompany
privacy policy documents to make it easier to see what
and how information is collected, used and disclosed. In
addition, toy makers should reconsider the need to share
user data with remote, potentially hacked databases.
Privacy vs. personalization vs. advertising cul-
ture. Smith and Shade [38] analyzed data surveillance
and commercialization practices in digital playgrounds
that trouble children’s and parent’s privacy rights. The
analysis was based on the privacy sweep method, used
to recreate the consumer experience and assess the trans-
parency of PII practices against some indicators. Three
indicators were adopted: (i) What political economy el-
ements surround the implementation of the digital play-
ground and its privacy policy? (ii) Do privacy commu-
nications adequately explain how PII is collected, used
and disclosed? (iii) Are users fully informed about how
PII collected by the device is stored and safeguarded?
The authors presented five reflections: (1) parents are
tasked to act as data proxies and supervisors for chil-
dren, (2) personalization is proposed as the benefit for
disclosing data, (3) advertising and promotional culture
is present in children’s digital playgrounds, (4) the algo-
rithms that power digital playgrounds remain opaque for
parents and (5) there are patterns in data stewardship for
digital playgrounds that parents may wish to examine.
Which smart toy is the most vulnerable? Shasha
et al. [2] proposed a vulnerability taxonomy for poten-
tial security and privacy flaws that can lead to private
information leakage or allow toy remote control for ma-
licious use. The taxonomy classifies the attacks into
15 types, split into three levels of proximity – physi-
cal, nearby and remote. They analyzed 11 smart toys,
w.r.t. network traffic analysis, reverse engineering and
code analysis of companion apps. They detected an ex-
cessive collection of unique IDs that facilitate tracking
of children on different services or platforms and send-
ing children’s PII to unauthorized entities. Most toys
expose children to threats that can be exploited by phys-
ical, nearby or remote attackers. Only two smart toys
showed no vulnerability to any type of attack. Inse-
cure bluetooth practice is the type of attack for which
smart toys are most vulnerable, identified for six toys;
followed by unauthorized configuration physical, unen-
crypted communication channels and URL redirect. The
authors present recommendations to smart toy makers:
fixing vulnerabilities, limiting data collection and im-
proving storage and communication security, securing
Bluetooth and WiFi connections, granting parents with
fine-grained access control, preparing the toy end-of-life
and being cautious with advertisement and tracking.
Formalizing the data flow and its privacy risks.
Yankson et al. [39] are interested in privacy-sensitive
points in the smart toys data flow. They argue that cur-
rent data flow modeling techniques do not have adequate
elements to address privacy in smart toys transactions.
This limitation of modeling techniques impairs the risk
analysis during the smart toy development and can in-
crease the chance of threats to the children’s privacy and
physical safety. As a solution, the authors propose to use
colored Petri nets to support it. Thus, they modeled sim-
ulations to show that it is possible to include elements on
privacy in the data flows. The authors concluded that us-
ing this modeling technique allows for flow analysis to
minimize the risk breaching the privacy of the child’s
data with the use of the toy being developed. Smart toy
developers can use this technique to analyze the privacy-
sensitive data flow for the toy being developed.
Not even basic best practices for security and pri-
vacy are followed. Chu, Apthorpe and Feamster [40]
conducted three anonymous case studies on security and
privacy risks on three smart toys. They analyzed net-
work and application vulnerabilities through static anal-
ysis (with publicly available documentation analysis and
application binary decompilation) and dynamic analy-
sis (with network monitoring through experimentation).
They uncovered a number of vulnerabilities undisclosed
to the public that violate COPPA and the toys’ individ-
ual privacy policies, which included security flaws in
network communications with first-party servers. These
were: lack of data encryption, lack of authentication for
accessing sensitive user information, POST token reuse,
sensitive user information in crash reports to third par-
ties and secret keys in source code constant files. Both
COPPA and individual privacy policies of the toys are
violated with such vulnerabilities. Moreover, they had
an indicative that toy makers are not following best secu-
rity and privacy practices, not even basic ones. Finally,
they point to the need for automated analysis to identify
privacy and security vulnerabilities for smart toys.
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5. Axial analysis
An axial analysis allowed us to evaluate both the
context addressed by current studies and a view of pos-
sible future research topics, as presented in this section.
5.1. Current scenario
Axial coding was performed for the 26 papers to
complement the content analysis. We adapted the tax-
onomy proposed by Loukil et al. [14], using four
facets related to privacy and security from the original
seven as our study has a more specific aim. In addi-
tion, we grouped security properties and security re-
quirements as a single sub-facet of information security
to make the taxonomy more suitable for our purposes.
Table 1 shows the classification of the findings, based
on the adapted taxonomy, that considers the concerns
expressed by their authors according to the terms used
by them. The classification used in our study has two
facets. The former (ISO privacy principles) refers to pri-
vacy risks involved in using smart toys, including threats
and vulnerabilities. The latter (privacy-preserving tech-
niques) refers to solutions to mitigate such privacy risks.
As relied by Loukil et al. [14], we assumed smart
toy makers should adhere to ISO privacy principles so as
not to pose risks to children. There are 11 privacy prin-
ciples, with one of them – information security – split
into six other principles. This second classification level
is important as information security is one of the most
important aspects to ensure information privacy. As for
privacy-preserving techniques, five main techniques are
considered: noise addition and anonymization (related
to data perturbation) and access control, cryptographic
and blockchain-based (related to data restriction).
Axial analysis consisted of identifying in the papers
which were presenting concerns on which of the prin-
ciples in the adopted taxonomy. Hence, we searched
for keywords that could show the concern of the au-
thors regarding each subject of the taxonomy. Each term
was accounted for in the data extraction for a given pa-
per only when a clear and explicit concern manifesta-
tion was found in the paper on the corresponding term.
The data shown in Table 1 reflect the researchers’ pri-
mary concerns on children’s privacy risks in using smart
toys as well as on the types of solutions to mitigate those
risks. Some of these risks and solutions are only briefly
mentioned in some papers, with shallow coverage, while
others have deep coverage. Thus, for a better charac-
terization, our analysis considered two possible levels
of coverage for each topic in each paper, considering
whether the paper addresses a particular risk or solution
in a Deep (D) or Shallow (S) way.
The analysis of this data is split into two parts: (i) by
principles or techniques addressed in the different pa-
pers and (ii) by papers addressing different principles or
techniques. For both cases, the numbers of D and S are
summed but with different weights: D was considered
as 1.0 point and S was considered as 0.5 point.
For the analysis by the 16 ISO privacy principles,
one can verify that some principles have raised more
concern of the authors than other principles. The six
types of risk most commonly addressed in the papers
published so far, with more than 10.0 points, are re-
lated to the following principles: (i) confidentiality (20.5
points), referring to child’s data protection from unau-
thorized accesses, disclosures and processes – one of
the information security sub-principles; (ii) use, reten-
tion and disclosure limitation (18.0 points), referring to
the need to limit to the maximum extent possible the use,
retention and disclosure of the child’s data; (iii) consent
and choice (17.0 points), referring to the need for con-
sent of the child’s parent for any type of operation to be
performed with the child’s data, including offering dif-
ferent options for them; (iv) authorization (16.5 points),
referring to provide permissions towards the child’s data
– one of the information security sub-principles; (v)
openness, transparency and notice (15.5 points), refer-
ring to the need for broad transparency by the smart toy
maker so that the child’ parent has extensive knowledge
of what is involved in the operations with the child’s
data; and (vi) authentication (13.0 points), referring to
ensure that a claimed characteristic of an entity is cor-
rect; one of the information security sub-principles.
Through this axial analysis of the 26 studies, one
can easily notice a pattern of concern by the authors,
who express a clear interest in basic privacy risks re-
lated to smart toys. The top six risks are related to the
basic principles to ensure children’s privacy while us-
ing smart toys. Confidentiality summarizes and repre-
sents the whole concern on privacy as the ultimate in-
tention is that confidentiality is protected, which natu-
rally leads also to authorization and authentication. The
other three principles are correlated and linked to the
need for toy makers and companies to be transparent,
responsible and careful with their data usage policies.
While these basic issues are still the subject of concern
by researchers, others are still timidly treated, although
also important to the ultimate goal.
Regarding the other ten principles, collection limi-
tation stands out (9.0 points). A reasonable number of
authors expressed concerns on the amount of data col-
lected by toy companies larger than necessary. On the
other hand, data minimization, the extreme of the princi-
ple of collection limitation, was the least mentioned (1.5
points). Minimizing data means that there should be a
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Tab. 1. Classification of the analyzed papers based on our adapted taxonomy et al. [14] (S-Shallow; D-Deep).
limitation on data processing, not just data collection. In
general, more specific privacy concerns, which are usu-
ally not obvious, have not yet been addressed. For exam-
ple, few authors have addressed individual participation
and access (3.5 points), which refers to giving users the
right to review, change, amend and remove their data in
a simple manner whenever desired.
As for privacy-preserving techniques, only two
data restriction-related techniques received a reason-
able number of mentions: cryptographic (14.5 points)
and access control (14.0 points). The high number of
cryptographic-related solutions reflects one of the re-
searchers’ larges concerns – the risk of a confidential-
ity breach. Several researchers addressed the need to
encrypt children’s PII, and possibly related data, when
using smart toys. Researchers are also interested in
proposing ways to control access to toys only to those
authorized. Access control can be treated with specific
levels and goals. One form is through parental control
tools, addressed in some of these papers as a proposed
solution to reduce the risks to children’s privacy.
Anonymization and noise addition were merely men-
tioned as solutions. It remains to be seen whether these
data perturbation-related techniques are not appropri-
ate for smart toys or whether they have not yet been
considered by researchers in this context. At least for
the general IoT context, according to Loukil et al. [14],
the number of solutions found related to anonymization
was about 60% greater than to access control. This sce-
nario is very different from the one found for smart toys.
Finally, solutions related to blockchain were not men-
tioned in any paper. However, this could be expected
as blockchain is a very recent technique. Even for the
more general IoT context, very few papers mentioned
blockchain as a possible solution to privacy risks [14].
Finally, one can observe that each of the 26 papers
addresses different perspectives of smart toy-related
children’s privacy risks and solutions. A few of them
do not address any type of solution, but only exist-
ing privacy risks [23, 24, 35]. Considering 21 items
(16 ISO privacy principles and five privacy preserva-
tion techniques), five papers can be considered quite
comprehensive, with more than 10.0 points counted
[25, 27, 28, 29, 34]. This result does not mean that these
five works are necessarily better than the others, but only
that they address more concerns in a single paper. This
view provides only a reference for researchers interested
in aspects related to smart toy-related children’s privacy.
5.2. Future research topics
Ensuring privacy and security is hard for researchers
and industry, especially for involving child users. Ta-
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ble 1 shows the magnitude of this complexity, as more
than 15 privacy principles should be addressed to ensure
an appropriate environment for the use of smart toys.
Several of these principles were only shyly addressed,
which may show the need for future research. This does
not necessarily mean that there is no need for further re-
search for others, especially when it turns out that few
solutions have been proposed for them.
From a risk standpoint, one can see that few authors
have addressed the need to limit data collection and even
less the need to minimize data use. Apparently, toy mak-
ers simply collect and use data in an ad hoc way without
careful analyzing the scenario at hand. Industry should
realize that personal data is valuable and should not be
treated as a disposable and worthless asset. This is a rel-
evant research line yet to be dealt with in more depth
from technical, social and policy point of views.
Other principles less addressed so far may have been
overlooked because they are more generic and can be ap-
plied directly to the field of smart toys without any speci-
ficity. However, specific studies should be conducted to
refine this hypothesis. For example, accuracy and qual-
ity are indeed common to any application domain, but it
is still not clear whether this principle has specific char-
acteristics regarding smart toys. This also applies to in-
dividual participation and access, as the need for users
to be able to review their data and change, if necessary,
is also a common requirement, but specific requirements
may exist for the smart toys domain.
Accountability and privacy compliance have also
been only marginally addressed so far and should be
the focus of future work. Once privacy policies have
been set, they need to be enforced, which should be done
through accountability and privacy compliance.
Specifically regarding security properties and re-
quirements, integrity and availability seem to be being
neglected for this domain. Similar to the points outlined
above, these two principles may be subject to future re-
search, as all properties and security requirements must
be guaranteed to ensure privacy as well.
Finally, from the solution point of view, the sum-
mary presented in Table 1 shows that almost no author
sought to apply data perturbation techniques, such as
noise addition. Experts in this type of technique could
investigate whether this application domain could ben-
efit from this type of solution beyond data restriction
techniques. In addition, privacy preservation solutions
in general represent, in fact, the great potential for con-
tribution in this area. Even studies that provide data
restriction-related solutions involving access control and
cryptograpic still do so to a very limited extent. For now,
the vast majority of studies are much more focused on
presenting problems than solutions.
6. Conclusion
The advent and use of smart toys have exacerbated
the children’s privacy risks due to the amount of PII that
they can collect and how ease toy makers can retain user
data. Parents usually expect privacy when their children
are using smart toys, which is not confirmed by many
of the 26 papers analyzed in this study. Ensuring chil-
dren’s privacy while using smart toys is vital because of
the risk associated with disclosure of sensitive informa-
tion that can lead to different types of harm to children.
Significant issues are data confidentiality, data use, re-
tention and disclosure limitation, authorization, consent
and choice to collect smart toy-related data, openness,
transparency and notice about collected data and au-
thentication mechanisms ensuring accuracy of data.
Some authors propose mitigation solutions to ad-
dress the raised risks at different stages of the develop-
ment and use life-cycle of smart toys. However, privacy
basics are the most questioned by researchers, while
other more complex principles have been overlooked.
This may show that toy makers have not yet successfully
addressed the minimum necessary to ensure privacy in
this area of interest. Overall, most analyzed papers ad-
dressed the implementation of security controls to pro-
tect the privacy of PII. The proposed solutions seek tech-
nical, administrative and operational security or privacy
controls preventing unauthorized access and disclosure
of information. This is shown through the results of our
taxonomy-based analysis.
As future work, a new evaluation framework can be
proposed, with a similar aim to those found and shown
herein, but more systematic and comprehensive, involv-
ing the whole classification adopted in this study.
References
[1] P. C. K. Hung, F. Iqbal, S.-C. Huang, M. Melaisi, and
K. Pang, “A glance of child’s play privacy in smart toys,”
in 2nd Int. Conf. on Cloud Comp. and Sec., pp. 217–231,
2016.
[2] S. Shasha, M. Mahmoud, M. Mannan, and A. Youssef,
“Playing with danger: A taxonomy and evaluation of
threats to smart toys,” IEEE Int. of Things J., vol. 6, no. 2,
pp. 2986–3002, 2018.
[3] EU, “GDPR – General Data Protection Regulation,”
2016. Eur. Parliament and Council of the Eur. Union.
[4] P. C. K. Hung, M. Fantinato, and J. Roa, “Children pri-
vacy protection,” in Encyclopedia of Computer Graphics
and Games (N. Lee, ed.), 2019.
[5] Canada, “PIPEDA – Personal Information Protection and
Electronic Documents Act,” 2018. Min. of Just., Canada.
[6] Brazil, “GLPPD – General Law of Protection of Personal
Data,” 2018. Brazil’s National Congress and Presidency
of the Republic.
[7] USA, “COPPA – Children’s Online Privacy Protection
Act,” 2002. Federal Trade Commis., US Congress, USA.
Page 1487
[8] P. C. K. Hung, M. Fantinato, and L. Rafferty, “A study of
privacy requirements for smart toys,” in 20th Pac. Asia
Conf. on Inf. Sys., pp. 1–7, 2016.
[9] M. Fantinato, P. C. K. Hung, Y. Jiang, J. Roa, P. Villar-
real, M. Melaisi, and F. Amancio, “A survey on purchase
intention of hello barbie in brazil and argentina,” in Com-
puting in Smart Toys (J. K. Tang and P. C. K. Hung, eds.),
pp. 21–34, 2017.
[10] M. Fantinato, P. C. K. Hung, Y. Jiang, J. Roa, P. Villar-
real, M. Melaisi, and F. Amancio, “A preliminary study
of hello barbie in Brazil and Argentina,” Sust. Cities and
Soc., vol. 40, pp. 83–90, 2018.
[11] E. P. d. S. Nunes, E. M. Lemos, C. Maciel, and
C. Nunes, “Human factors and interaction strategies in
three-dimensional virtual environments to support the
development of digital interactive therapeutic toy: A sys-
tematic review,” in 7th Int. Conf. on Vir., Augm. and
Mixed Real., pp. 368–378, 2015.
[12] E. P. d. S. Nunes, V. A. d. Conceic¸a˜o Jr, L. V. G. San-
tos, M. F. L. Pereira, and L. C. L. D. F. Borges, “Inclu-
sive toys for rehabilitation of children with disability: A
systematic review,” in 11th Int. Conf. on Univ. Access in
Human-Comp. Inter., pp. 503–514, 2017.
[13] A. P. d. Albuquerque and J. Kelner, “Toy user interfaces:
Systematic and industrial mapping,” J. of Sys. Arch.,
vol. 97, no. Aug, pp. 77–106, 2018.
[14] F. Loukil, C. Ghedira-Guegan, A. N. Benharkat,
K. Boukadi, and Z. Maamar, “Privacy-aware in the IoT
applications: A systematic literature review,” in 25th Int.
Conf. on Coop. Inf. Sys., pp. 552–569, 2017.
[15] T. Oktavia, Y. Tjong, H. Prabowo, and Meyliana, “Secu-
rity and privacy challenge in bring your own device en-
vironment: A systematic literature review,” in 2016 Int.
Conf. on Inf. Man. and Tech., pp. 194–199, 2017.
[16] B. Nelson and T. Olovsson, “Security and privacy for big
data: A systematic literature review,” in 2016 IEEE Int.
Conf. on Big Data, pp. 3693–3702, 2016.
[17] B. Kitchenham and S. Charters, “Guidelines for perform-
ing systematic literature reviews in software engineer-
ing,” Tech. Rep. EBSE-2007-01, Keele Univ. and Univ.
of Durham, UK, 2007. Version 2.3.
[18] J. vom Brocke, A. Simons, B. Niehaves, K. Riemer,
R. Plattfaut, and A. Cleven, “Reconstructing the giant:
On the importance of rigour in documenting the literature
search process,” in 17th Eur. Conf. on Inf. Sys., pp. 2206–
2217, 2009.
[19] T. Denning, C. Matuszek, K. Koscher, J. R. Smith, and
T. Kohno, “A spotlight on security and privacy risks with
future household robots: attacks and lessons,” in 11th Int.
Conf. on Ubiq. Comp., pp. 105–114, 2009.
[20] S. Yong, D. Lindskog, R. Ruhl, and P. Zavarsky, “Risk
mitigation strategies for mobile Wi-Fi robot toys from
online pedophiles,” in 2011 Int. Conf. on Priv., Secur.,
Risk and Trust, pp. 1220–1223, 2011.
[21] J.-S. Pleban, R. Band, and R. Creutzburg, “Hacking and
securing the AR.Drone 2.0 quadcopter: Investigations
for improving the security of a toy,” in Mobile Devices
and Multimedia: Enabling Technologies, Algorithms,
and Applications, pp. 1–12, 2014.
[22] M. L. Jones and K. Meurer, “Can (and should) Hello Bar-
bie keep a secret?,” in 2016 IEEE Int. Symp. on Ethics in
Engin., Sci. and Tech., pp. 1–7, 2016.
[23] M. L. Jones, “Your new best frenemy: Hello barbie and
privacy without screens,” Engaging Sci., Tech., and Soc.,
vol. 2, pp. 242–246, 2016.
[24] D. Holloway and L. Green, “The internet of toys,”
Comm. Res. and Prac., pp. 1–14, 2016.
[25] L. Rafferty, P. Hung, M. Fantinato, S. M. Peres, F. Iqbal,
S. Kuo, and S. Huang, “Towards a privacy rule concep-
tual model for smart toys,” in 50th Hawaii Int. Conf. on
Sys. Sci., pp. 1–10, 2017.
[26] E. McReynolds, S. Hubbard, T. Lau, A. Saraf, M. Cak-
mak, and F. Roesner, “Toys that listen: A study of
parents, children, and internet-connected toys,” in 2017
ACM SIGCHI Conf. on Human Factors in Comp. Sys.,
pp. 5197–5207, 2017.
[27] L. G. Carvalho and M. M. Eler, “Security requirements
for smart toys,” in 19th Int. Conf. on Ent. Inf. Sys.,
pp. 144–154, 2017.
[28] L. G. Carvalho and M. M. Eler, “Security requirements
and tests for smart toys,” in 19th Int. Conf. on Ent. Inf.
Sys., pp. 291–312, 2018.
[29] L. G. Carvalho and M. M. Eler, “Security tests for smart
toys,” in 20th Int. Conf. on Ent. Inf. Sys., pp. 111–120,
2018.
[30] C. Moini, “Protecting privacy in the era of smart toys:
Does hello barbie have a duty to report,” Cath. Univ. J.
of Law and Tech., vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 281–318, 2017.
[31] J. Valente and A. A. Cardenas, “Security & privacy in
smart toys,” in 1st Work. on Int. of Things Sec. and Priv.,
pp. 19–24, 2017.
[32] M. Mahmoud, M. Z. Hossen, H. Barakat, M. Mannan,
and A. Youssef, “Towards a comprehensive analytical
framework for smart toy privacy practices,” in 7th Work.
on Socio-Tech. Asp. in Sec. and Trust, pp. 64–75, 2017.
[33] J. Haynes, M. Ramirez, T. Hayajneh, and M. Z. A.
Bhuiyan, “A framework for preventing the exploitation
of IoT smart toys for reconnaissance and exfiltration,”
in 10th Int. Conf. on Sec., Priv. and Anony. in Comp.,
Comm. and Storage, pp. 581–592, 2017.
[34] K. Demetzou, L. Bo¨ck, and O. Hanteer, “Smart bears
don’t talk to strangers: Analysing privacy concerns and
technical solutions in smart toys for children,” in Living
in the Int. of Things: Cybersec. of the IoT, pp. 1–7, 2018.
[35] N. Kshetri and J. Voas, “Cyberthreats under the bed,”
Computer, vol. 51, no. 5, pp. 92–95, 2018.
[36] J. L. Espinosa-Aranda, N. Vallez, J. M. Rico-Saavedra,
J. Parra-Patino, G. Bueno, M. Sorci, D. Moloney,
D. Pena, and O. Deniz, “Smart doll: Emotion recogni-
tion using embedded deep learning,” Symmetry, vol. 10,
no. 9, pp. 1–18, 2018.
[37] W. Chowdhury, “Toys that talk to strangers: A look at
the privacy policies of connected toys,” in Conf. of Fut.
Tech. Conf., pp. 152–158, 2018.
[38] K. L. Smith and L. R. Shade, “Childrens digital play-
grounds as data assemblages: Problematics of privacy,
personalization, and promotional culture,” Big Data &
Soc., vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 1–12, 2018.
[39] B. Yankson, F. Iqbal, Z. Lu, X. Wang, and P. C. K. Hung,
“Modeling privacy preservation in smart connected toys
by petri-nets,” in 52nd Hawaii Int. Conf. on Sys. Sci.,
pp. 1696–1705, 2019.
[40] G. Chu, N. Apthorpe, and N. Feamster, “Security and pri-
vacy analyses of internet of things children’s toys,” IEEE
Int. of Things J., vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 978–985, 2019.
Page 1488
